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Résumé : Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen-
Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen-
Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et
d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que
Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui
de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans
la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit
reconnaître et qui ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité.
Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen-
Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans
l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considé-
rations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos
activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience
pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que
Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité indivi-
duelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique.
Abstract: In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of
science, which he developed as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians.
Frischeisen-Köhler drew on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey
and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s
criticism of Marburg and Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. This criticism re-
volves around the view that reality factors into cognition as a fully indepen-
dent element that cognition must acknowledge and can never construct out of
its own intrinsic lawfulness. In the fifth section I focus on Frischeisen-Köhler’s
“phenomenology”. His main thesis is that reality is experienced as such in
action in such a way that our consciousness of reality does not stem from
theoretical considerations about the hypothetical causes of our sensations but
from our transactions in the world as agents. Science is thus founded on this
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pre-scientific experience of reality. I conclude with a criticism of Frischeisen-
Köhler’s distinction between consciousness in general and individual subjec-
tivity from a phenomenological viewpoint.
Our implicitly monumental way of writing and teaching the history of
philosophy often effaces from view the work of thinkers whose merit isn’t due
to the invention of new concepts, but rather to the patient examination and
appraisal of dominant philosophical trends in order to gauge their value and
viability for future research. This kind of work is admittedly less spectacular,
but no less important, and sometimes even more instructive than the solitary
efforts of celebrated philosophical giants.
It is in this spirit that this paper sets out to explore the philosophical work
of a forgotten early twentieth century German philosopher, Max Frischeisen-
Köhler (1878-1923). Frischeisen-Köhler was a student of Wilhelm Dilthey in
Berlin, where he received both his doctoral degree (1902) and his Habilitation
(1906). After a period as Privatdozent, in 1915 he moved to the University
of Halle where he was promoted to Ordinarius in 1921, just two years before
his untimely death in 1923. His brief portrayal in the catalogus professorum
halensis1 describes Frischeisen-Köhler as an engaging teacher and esteemed
scholar, whose appointment was strongly supported by the prominent Kantian
philosopher Hans Vaihinger.
Frischeisen-Köhler was a prolific writer and an active editor. When he
died prematurely at the age of forty-five he had published three major books
and a handful of papers in some of the most important philosophical jour-
nals of his time, including Kantstudien and Archiv für die Geschichte der
Philosophie. Moreover, starting in 1913 he worked as the editor of a short-lived
but highly innovative project, the Jahrbücher der Philosophie, which published
survey articles in the various subfields of philosophy. The Jahrbücher bear
witness to Frischeisen-Köhler’s encyclopedic and syncretic spirit, which en-
abled him to spot affinities and intersections between prima facie very different
philosophical projects.
This last remark leads me straight to the philosophical substance of
Frischeisen-Köhler’s work. In this paper I will focus primarily on his opus
magnum Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit [Science and Reality] published in
1912 and on a few other papers dealing with the same issue. Wissenschaft
und Wirklichkeit has two chief merits. First, it presents a wide-ranging and
penetrating criticism of the two main schools of neo-Kantianism (the Marburg
school and the Baden or Southwestern school) conducted from a Diltheyean
standpoint. This is an extremely valuable contribution, one that Dilthey him-
self failed to deliver. In spite of extended criticism especially from Wilhelm
Windelband [Windelband 1915] and Heinrich Rickert [Rickert 1926], Dilthey
1. Online resource:
http://www.catalogus-professorum-halensis.de/frischeisenkoehlermax.html.
Frischeisen-Köhler – The Material Component of Cognition 121
never managed to produce a sustained counter-criticism of the neo-Kantian
approach to the demarcation of the sciences. Second, in Wissenschaft und
Wirklichkeit Frischeisen-Köhler’s articulates a sophisticated version of what
he calls “phenomenology” drawing heavily on Husserl’s Logical Investigations
but combining it with insights about the structure of our consciousness of re-
ality [Realitätsbewusstsein] stemming from his teacher Dilthey. Remarkably,
one year before the appearance of Husserl’s Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology
and Phenomenological Philosophy [Husserl 2014] and without having any ac-
cess to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts or exposure to Husserl’s lectures
in Göttingen, Frischeisen-Köhler realized that the project put forward in the
Logical Investigations could have a bearing on the theory of the empirical
sciences over and above the clarification of the logical structures of scien-
tific theorizing in general. Thus, it can be argued that Frischeisen-Köhler
is the first philosopher to understand and bring to fruition the deep-seated
affinity between Husserl’s and Dilthey’s projects, thereby showing a much
keener philosophical instinct than, for instance, Georg Misch, whose book
Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie [Misch 1930] only manages to insist
on differences and is still unduly considered the first study to have compared
and contrasted these two traditions of thought.
I follow the structure of Wissenschaft and Wirklichkeit and start with a
pars destruens where I present Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of the two neo-
Kantian schools. As the title of this paper indicates, the gist of this critique is
a Kantian vindication of the matter of cognition, arguing that intuition (which,
in a Kantian framework, delivers the matter of cognition) cannot be plausibly
construed as a mere limit-concept to be further resolved into underlying log-
ical processes (Marburg school) or as a mere chaotic residue that conceptual
thought has to organize (Southwestern school). In his work on the foundations
of the human sciences Dilthey had forcefully argued that in this theoretical
domain we do not encounter inchoate jumbles of data that our intellect has
to weave together on the basis of extrinsic hypotheses. Both at the individual
and the communal level, the world of spirit [die geistige Welt] presents itself as
a multifarious array of meaningful nexuses [Lebenszusammenhänge] that con-
ceptual thought has to disentangle and clarify. In this context, intuition is not
just a blind source of inputs, but rather a cognitively laden dimension, against
which conceptual thought has to constantly measure itself up. Frischeisen-
Köhler sets out to fully exploit and generalize this Diltheyean view, arguing
that, in an appropriately modified manner, intuition has an independent cogni-
tive import also in the investigation of nature. In the second part of the paper
I move to the pars construens of Frischeisen-Köhler’s phenomenology. Unlike
the Husserl of Ideas, Frischeisen-Köhler believes that a correctly executed phe-
nomenology leads us to embrace a form of sophisticated realism. This is not
the naïve realism of common sense, which takes things in the world to exist
in exactly the way in which they appear to our senses. Frischeisen-Köhler’s
brand of realism considers “reality” to be an ineradicable factor in our experi-
ence of the world, although it falls upon empirical science to determine what
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this reality actually is like, thereby departing from the immediate deliverances
of the senses [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 252]. I conclude with a few remarks
on strengths and weaknesses of Frischeisen-Köhler’s phenomenology.
1 Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of
Marburg neo-Kantianism
Frischeisen-Köhler indicates the central fixture of his inquiry in the “prob-
lem of reality” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 4]. What does Wirklichkeit means?
Do we have to posit things in themselves over and above the things we di-
rectly experience? How can we decide between the divergent theories handed
down by the philosophical tradition (realism, phenomenalism, conscientialism,
idealism, etc.)?
In order to begin to tackle the problem of reality, we need to take our
departure in what Frischeisen-Köhler labels “the critical standpoint”. This
means, in a genuinely Kantian fashion: “Whether the task of our cognition
consists in the grasp of a cognition-independent reality can only be decided
from the standpoint of cognition itself, that is, only through an insight into
the means of cognition”. In this respect, the critical standpoint claims to
be free of presuppositions. This claim, however, can be disputed if one con-
siders cognition merely as an empirical fact pertaining to the psychology of
human beings. If this were the case, then the critical standpoint would pre-
suppose the validity of human psychology. On this point Frischeisen-Köhler
sides with critics of psychologism such as Husserl and Riehl in rejecting the
characterization of cognition as a mere psychological fact and accepts the au-
tonomy of logical laws, however, with one caveat: in spite of their autonomy,
logical laws are only accessible through our concrete experience of thinking
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 13].
Frischeisen-Köhler begins by setting out the most general principles of
“pure thinking” that must be captured by a theory of reality: (1) the concept
of object, as that toward which thought is directed; (2) the positing of the
object, as a normative commitment to the validity of what is thought under the
concept of object at hand; (3) the determination of the object, as the ability to
establish and verify relations holding among the object’s constitutive elements
and among a plurality of objects [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 20–31].
However, the acknowledgment of these three components does not have any
direct bearing on the problem of reality. They only determine the framework
in which the problem of reality can be meaningfully posed.
The Marburg school of neo-Kantianism attempts to solve the problem
of reality exclusively by way of elaborating on the logical functions of pure
thinking. Frischeisen-Köhler therefore characterizes Marburg neo-Kantianism
as “logical idealism” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 34], in that it denies the ex-
istence of a thought-independent given [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 35]. There
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is, of course, room for experience in the Marburg school’s philosophical sys-
tem, however, “experience” only names the nexus of that which has to be
determined conceptually. In particular, sensory experience is considered to be
accessible only through the mediation of ordering concepts, such as spatio-
temporal systems of coordinates. As such, sensory experience does not play
an independent role in cognition. Cognition is interpreted as a never-ending
process in which the conceptual functions of thought articulate themselves and
become increasingly complex. Frischeisen-Köhler quotes Cassirer’s Substance
and Function [Cassirer 1923] as the culmination of Marburger logical idealism,
in that Cassirer replaces the old dualism of subject and object with a “series of
levels in the degrees of objectivity within the one system of experience”, such
that the “core of the concept of reality is understood as the logical differences
of the contents of experience and their integration in an articulated system
of interdependences” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 39]. In Paul Natorp’s famous
dictum: the given [das Gegebene] is actually nothing more than a task [ein
Aufgegebenes] for cognition to solve [Natorp 1887, 282–283].
Against this “dissolution of the given into a phase of the process of cogni-
tion” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 52], Frischeisen-Köhler argues that while it is
perfectly plausible to consider all determination and order in experience to be
reducible to a system of relations stemming from our conceptual functions, the
material factor of cognition can never be deduced or somehow derived from
such system. Evidence for the underivability of the material factor of cognition
can be found, for instance, in the ubiquitous presence of numerical constants
even in the most sophisticated and advanced scientific theories [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1912, 43]. The logical idealist attempt to reduce the object of cognition
to a determinable X within a systematic nexus of logical functions does not do
justice to the fact that in actual cognition our logical apparatus “rubs against”
a material factor that possesses a determination in itself, prior to and indepen-
dently from the operations of thought. Moreover, constructivist theories like
the Marburg neo-Kantians’ tend to downplay the fact that scientific theories
nonetheless have to relate back to factual situations that are fundamentally
extrinsic to such theories. In Frischeisen-Köhler’s words:
No matter how high up to ever more general laws theory ascends
in its aspiration to comprehensiveness, since they are not meant to
hold for an arbitrary possible world in general but for our unique
world, these laws must entail a determination that expresses this
relation to our world and makes possible to revert back to appear-
ances in this world. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 47]
Here Frischeisen-Köhler speaks of a characteristic historicity and facticity of
the object of scientific cognition that logical reason has to take into account
and cannot construct out of its own inner lawfulness. Full consideration of
this point leads Frischeisen-Köhler to rehabilitate sensibility as an irreducible
component in our scientific thinking. As he explains quoting Pierre Duhem as
an ally:
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We can only have sensations within spatial and temporal order-
ings and in relation to their kinds; but this does not mean that
sensation is itself a relation. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 54]
Frischeisen-Köhler explains this point with the example of the evolutions in
our image of the Earth. We transitioned from the idea that the Earth is a
disc, to the idea that it is a sphere, and further to the idea that it is a rotating
spheroid. These are not just stages in a never-ending process of cognitive
sophistication, but rather progressive adjustments motivated by the desire to
harmonize what we think and what we see.
Frischeisen-Köhler’s position does not amount to a crude empiricism or to
a pre-critical realism, according to which the deliverances of our senses sim-
ply dictate what we ought to think. In accordance with Kant, he considers
thinking as a spontaneous and independent force that brings its own intrinsic
potential to fruition in cognitive acts, thanks to the objective validity of its own
principles. A full embrace of this perspective, however, does not exclude the
possibility of positing further categories that do not stem from the functions
of judgment, but are phenomenologically ascribable to the very material of
experience. The task of scientific thinking is thus the harmonization of the de-
mands stemming from thinking’s intrinsic lawfulness (logic) and the demands
stemming from a phenomenologically grounded consideration of structures and
categories rooted in sensory experience. Frischeisen-Köhler aligns himself here
with a tradition of thought that goes back to Hermann Lotze’s theory of first
universals in the Logik [Lotze 1887, § 14], is recast by Carl Stumpf in Zur
Einteilung der Wissenschaften [Stumpf 1906, 37], and finds its most complete
expression in the late Husserl’s celebrated notion of passive synthesis [Husserl
2001]. In Frischeisen-Köhler’s own rendition:
The “passive” sensations contain also those relations that, of
course, thinking alone is able to develop, but that thinking does
not create. [...] These relations can be only experienced alongside
with sensations, albeit not as independent sensations in addition
to the former. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 91]
In a way that anticipates much later reflections by French phenomenolo-
gist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Frischeisen-Köhler speaks of a “tacit thinking
[schweigendes Denken] that operates in perception itself” [Frischeisen-Köhler
1912, 91].
2 Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of
Southwestern neo-Kantianism on
epistemology
It is now time to turn to Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of Southwestern neo-
Kantianism, in particular, of Heinrich Rickert’s monumental project of tran-
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scendental foundation of science in Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Begriffsbildung [Rickert 1929]. This critique is particularly significant, since it
is Rickert, and not the Marburger, who subjected Frischeisen-Köhler’s mentor
Dilthey to the most scathing criticism. Frischeisen-Köhler thus takes it upon
itself to vindicate his teacher’s position.
The gist of Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of Rickert’s philosophy of sci-
ence is already present in two long articles published in 1906 [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1906a,b]. The sections on Rickert in Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit
are lifted almost verbatim from these two articles. Compared to them, how-
ever, Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit entails both less and more. A thorough
paraphrase of Rickert’s theses is omitted, but the discussion of Rickert’s phi-
losophy of science is prefaced by a critical discussion of his more general
epistemological commitments as they are presented in the article Zwei Wege
der Erkenntnistheorie [Rickert 1909] and in his Rickert’s systematic work Der
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis [Rickert 1928].
In both writings Rickert construes the object of knowledge as a transcen-
dent truth-value, rather than a mind-independent reality. In very brief com-
pass, when we issue the judgment “the cat is on the mat” (and supposing the
judgment is true at the time of utterance) what we are affirming is neither
the cat, nor the mat but rather the transcendent value “truth”, insofar as this
value exerts its normative force on our thinking through the necessary con-
nection of the elements in the complex presentation “cat-on-the-mat” [Rickert
1909, 186]. The subjective echo of the objectively valid truth-value is the
feeling of evidence we directly experience in concomitance with the judgment
[Rickert 1909, 188]. On Rickert’s account, what elicits our approval in this case
cannot be a being [Sein]. Mere facts do not possess normative force. Only
something experienced as a Sollen can come forward as a demand and require
our approval [Rickert 1909, 184]. This is why, as Rickert puts it, the object
of knowledge grasped by true judgment cannot lie in the sphere of being, but
only in the sphere of ought. The demand comes from an objectively valid value
and not from a subjectively experienced being. While being is through and
through a content of consciousness, i.e., it is experienced or at least experi-
enceable in principle, only values for Rickert are genuinely transcendent, that
is, only values exceed the scope of what is experienced through the senses and
force the subject to go beyond consciousness in order to acknowledge them.2
Frischeisen-Köhler outright rejects this construal of judgment and cogni-
tion. First, he rejects Rickert’s characterization of truth as a value and of
judgment as a kind of valuation on phenomenological grounds:
Decisions about values [Wertentscheidungen] presuppose a reac-
tion of feeling as their psychological foundation. We consider
a thing agreeable because it arouses in us feelings of pleasure.
2. For a more comprehensive account of Rickert’s theory of judgment, see
[Staiti 2015].
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However, the decision about true and false is never a matter of
feeling. The feeling of evidence or certainty is neither the psy-
chological, nor the logical foundation that determines the affir-
mation or negation, or better, the decision about true and false.
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 120–121]
This is in essence the very same phenomenological distinction advocated
by Husserl in an unpublished manuscript about Rickert’s Zwei Wege essay
[Husserl 1910] and later in the context of his lectures on ethics [Husserl 2004].
Husserl points out that “Windelband and his school” (read: Rickert), misled
by the equivocal meaning of the word “value” and its derivatives, conflate
the feeling-based activity of valuing and normative consciousness in general
[Husserl 2004, 316]. Husserl continues:
The insight in which a logical truth is given to me, the process
of grounding [Begründungsprozess] in which an intention is mea-
sured up against the corresponding insight and thereby acquires
its normative status [Normhaftigkeit]—these are not emotional
acts [Gemütsakte], but rather acts of the cognitive sphere. In the
same sense in which judging is not valuing, truth is not value.
[Husserl 2004, 316]
The similarity between Frischeisen-Köhler’s and Husserl’s criticism is striking.
Considering the abundant marks on his personal copy of Wissenschaft und
Wirklichkeit3 Husserl may have been directly inspired by Frischeisen-Köhler
in his later formulation of this line of thought. In sum, for both Frischeisen-
Köhler and Husserl, Rickert’s theory of judgment is based on a terminologi-
cal equivocation and a phenomenologically untenable conflation of normative
consciousness in general and valuation. This leads Rickert to falsify the phe-
nomenological data and suggest that we experience some kind of psychological
necessitation to judge when we are confronted with evident states of affairs
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 121]. True, as Husserl argues, we can always direct
second-order intentions toward first-order acts of cognition and their correlates.
Such second-order intentions can be the vehicles for feeling-based valuations.
We can, for instance, rejoice at a scientific discovery. But such second-order
intentions are not in turn cognitive acts and should not be conflated with the
latter (see also [Husserl 2012, 156]).
Importantly, Frischeisen-Köhler agrees with Rickert that the object of
knowledge lies beyond the mere given. This is the guiding principle of tran-
scendental philosophy and “must be acknowledged” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912,
127]. What Frischeisen-Köhler wants to suggest is that the object of knowledge
sought after by scientific cognition need not be identified with transcendent val-
ues and norms. Simple perceptual intentionality is characterized by reference
to a transcendent object that exceeds the manifold perceptual appearances
through which it is given. This has nothing to do with cognitive judgments or
3. Preserved at the Husserl Archive in Leuven, Belgium, under the code BQ 152.
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value-consciousness. The given always points by itself beyond itself toward an
object of which it is a manifestation. From Frischeisen-Köhler’s perspective
this fact about perceptual intentionality is reflected in natural science, which
relates what is immediately given in our experience to entities that cannot
be directly observed. Rather than simply ordering our sensations according
to a priori principles—as Rickert’s phenomenalistic account seems to imply—
natural science invokes unobservable entities such as atoms, molecules, forces,
and the like. If one considers such unobservable entities pure figments or fabri-
cations, then, Frischeisen-Köhler remarks, “physics and natural science in their
entirety deal always and exclusively with these fabrications, to which they
relate individual appearances” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 138]. Like Stumpf
[Stumpf 1906, 16], whom he quotes approvingly, Frischeisen-Köhler defends
scientific realism contra positivistic and idealistic phenomenalism.
3 Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of
Southwestern neo-Kantianism on
natural science
In spite of his rejection of Rickert’s theory of judgment and the misleading
implications it has for our understanding of science, Frischeisen-Köhler cred-
its Rickert for his original contribution to another area of the philosophy of
logic, namely, the theory of concept-formation in Die Grenzen der naturwis-
senschaftlichen Begriffsbildung [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 231].
As Frischeisen-Köhler recognizes, Rickert’s work can be read as an attempt
to develop and partly correct an insight originally put forward by Rickert’s
teacher Wilhelm Windelband [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 228]. In his rector’s
address Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft Windelband famously rejects the
distinction between Geisteswissenschaft and Naturwissenschaft, arguing that
the overwhelming bulk of the human sciences do not deal with mental pro-
cesses, as the word “Geist” suggests [Windelband 1980]. Moreover, if we con-
sider the only science that fits the wording Geisteswissenschaft, i.e., psychol-
ogy, it turns out that it works in a patently different way than other putative
Geisteswissenschaften. Unlike, say, art history, psychology makes abundant
use of experiments and quantitative models. Windelband suggests that we
shift our perspective and demarcate different provinces of science first and
foremost by reference to their methodological outlook. This shift leads him
to distinguish between nomothetic and idiographic sciences, i.e., sciences that
set out to determine general laws and sciences that set out to portray individ-
ual events. These two methodological tendencies correspond to the province
of natural science and the province of history, respectively. In keeping with
Windelband, Rickert speaks of the natural sciences as characterized by a gen-
eralizing method. The natural sciences form their concepts by disregarding
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the individual, unrepeatable content of our experiences and looking only at
lawfully regulated patterns that are common to an infinite number of individ-
ual occurrences. Qua generalizing, the natural sciences craft their concepts
by departing from immediately experienced reality. On the contrary, history
is characterized by an individualizing method, that is, it forms its concepts
in order to grasp unrepeatable individual occurrences. Contra Windelband,
Rickert refuses to characterize the method of history as idiographic because
this term seems to downplay the fact that history, too, creates genuine con-
cepts, and not just intuitive portrayals of past events. Thus, in keeping with
the title of Rickert’s book, individual reality is the limit of natural scientific
concept-formation. A complementary kind of concept-formation is therefore
both possible and necessary. This is the individualizing concept formation of
history, whose grounding principle is, as mentioned above, value. According
to Rickert, only the reference to culturally recognized values makes individual
occurrences relevant in their individuality. Values thus function as criteria to
select both the objects of historical inquiry and the elements in these objects
that are relevant to the inquiry at issue. Suppose, for instance, that I decided
to investigate scientifically the recent history of the United States. I would
then have to choose events and people that are relevant to my narrative, and
furthermore I would have to select the specific aspects of these events and peo-
ple that are historically significant. I would probably choose to speak about
Barack Obama rather than my best friend at high school, and to focus on
Barack Obama’s political career rather than the color of his suits.
Frischeisen-Köhler levels a number of critiques at Rickert’s position, al-
though he admires the consistency and systematic comprehensiveness of
Rickert’s approach. As for the natural sciences, Frischeisen-Köhler agrees that
they are characterized by a tendency to generalization. However, the gener-
alizing method is neither the only nor the most significant aspect of natural
scientific concept-formation.
First, prior to all generalization the natural sciences employ an analytic
method that does not depart from individual appearances but rather organizes
and selects elements within them. Following Wilhelm Wundt, Frischeisen-
Köhler calls this procedure “isolating abstraction” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a,
236], [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 153]. Isolating abstraction is a method to orga-
nize analytically the complex phenomena given in experience. The disregarded
elements of a complex phenomenon are temporarily set aside but they can be
retrieved at any time for the pursuit of different lines of research. This mode
of thinking seems to be preeminent, for instance, in chemistry. To give but
one example, the periodic table cannot be seen as the product of mere gen-
eralization from individual givens of experience. Different chemical elements
must be abstractly isolated from experienced compounds before they can be
generalized and systematized in the periodic table. A correct theory of natu-
ral scientific conceptualization should thus study the interplay of isolation and
generalization, rather than focusing on generalization alone.
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Second, both Windelband and Rickert seem to consider “generality” and
“law-based necessity” as synonymous. Rickert is right that in order to be able
to master theoretically the unsurveyable multiplicity of experience we need
to be able to grasp individual occurrences as instances of universally valid
natural laws. However, this does not follow from the notion of generality per
se. Aristotelian forms would do the job as well. They, too, are characterized
by generality in the sense that they pick out aspects of things that are taken to
be eternally recurrent and common to an infinite number of factual individuals
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 239]. But the system of Aristotelian forms is not a
system of laws. Thus, law-based necessity in accordance with the principle of
causality is an additional and crucial component of natural science that cannot
be reduced to mere generality. Careful consideration of this fact adds weight
to the overall argument of the book that the material of scientific cognition
has an import of its own for the cognitive process. In fact, Frischeisen-Köhler
argues, “only the content-related insight that an encompassing nexus of cause
and effect constitutes the natural whole takes us beyond merely classificatory
concept-formation to real concepts of laws” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 241].
In other words, the fact that we need causal laws as opposed to other forms
of generality in order to investigate nature does not follow from a merely
logical consideration of how we form concepts. It is based on the fact that
the real nature we experience is causally structured and therefore amenable to
law-based explanation.
Third, Rickert’s characterization of natural science as aspiring to ever-
increasing levels of generality, all the way up to an “ultimate natural science”
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 243–244] or what contemporary idiom would call
a theory of everything, seems to forget two important things: (1) laws pre-
suppose something which is not law and for which they hold; (2) even the
most sophisticated and general scientific theories must allow for a “return to
the particular” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906a, 257]. For Rickert, since the physi-
cal world is a unitary whole, all natural sciences should be seen as elements
of one overarching scientific system or as preparatory stages toward a uni-
fied general theory of the physical world. This, however, does not follow.
It could be the case that the physical world only appears to be overall uni-
fied in immediate, pre-scientific experience, but upon scientific scrutiny turns
out to consist of a plurality of mutually irreducible elements governed by a
plurality of mutually irreducible laws. Frischeisen-Köhler invokes the fact of
consciousness and its irreducibility to matter as evidence that the ultimate con-
stituents of reality cannot be seen as law-based specifications of an underlying,
more fundamental level.
Finally, Rickert’s argument that natural scientific concepts are unsuitable
for the representation of individuals is disputable. Astronomy is a glaring
example. It does not merely set out to determine general laws, but also their
realization in a factually determined portion of reality. True, most natural
sciences are not particularly interested in the determination of this or that
particular occurrence in the world. However, this does not mean that their
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concepts are intrinsically unsuitable to fulfill this task. In fact, several natural
sciences do not only move from the particular to the general, but rather from
the particular, to the general, and back to the particular.
4 Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of
Southwestern neo-Kantianism
on history
As for the historical sciences, Frischeisen-Köhler finds Rickert’s insistence on
value as the fundamental governing principle of historical concept-formation
unwarranted. Recall that for Rickert value-relatedness is the ground of his-
torically relevant individuality. Values are the principles that throw certain
experienced objects into relief as unique individuals in contrast to value-free
natural objects. In a passage from Grenzen Rickert tries to elucidate his view
on this matter by comparing two objects: a lump of coal and the famous Koh-
i-noor diamond. Both are individuals in the broad sense of being unique and
unrepeatable occurrences in the world. However, only the Koh-i-noor is an
individual in the etymological sense of being indivisible, or better, not-to-be-
divided [Rickert 1986, 82–83]. The lump of coal can be destroyed and replaced
at any time, but the Koh-i-noor will be carefully preserved from destruction.
Rickert comments:
There is no doubt that it is only this difference between two
kinds of individuals that is applicable to all bodies in such a way
that, from this perspective, the entire physical world falls into two
groups of realities. [Rickert 1986, 83]
Frischeisen-Köhler counters that Rickert’s distinction is by no means con-
vincing. There is a group of objects whose individuality rests on an inner
principle of organization that is not value-related, and yet cannot be equated
to inert physical things such as lumps of coal. These objects are living or-
ganisms [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906b, 456]. For living organisms the principle
of unification is even more objectively grounded than for items like the Koh-
i-noor, since it does not rest upon the observer’s valuations but is inherent
in the organisms’ very existence. The kind of objective unity pertaining to
living organisms is particularly prominent in psychophysical beings such as
humans, whose psychic life, too, is governed by autonomous principles of uni-
fication that have nothing to do with values. If this is true, however, then
Rickert’s claim that the principle of value-relatedness is “the only difference”
for a comprehensive demarcation of entities in the world is false. There is an
even more substantive and significant principle: the presence or absence of a
directly experienceable structural principle of unification in the entity at issue
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1906b, 458].
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Even if we assume for the sake of argument that value-relatedness does
have some central function in historical concept-formation, it is not clear that
it is sufficient (as Rickert would have it) to pick out historically relevant ob-
jects and, within these objects, historically relevant features. If the task of
historical concept-formation is to produce knowledge about individuals, then
before we select their historically relevant features we need a sufficiently rich
description of such individuals, one that includes a broader number of features
than the ones we can directly relate to values. According to Rickert’s method-
ology, however, this preliminary characterization of the individual under con-
sideration would have to enumerate features that by Rickertean standards are
only relevant for natural-scientific purposes [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906b, 462],
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 164]. To stay with Rickert’s example, suppose we
decided to write an essay on the Koh-i-noor and its various historical vicis-
situdes. We would probably need to start by characterizing the diamond in
terms of its extraordinary size, carat weight, and cut. These features, how-
ever, would not be listed for the sake of natural-scientific generalization but
precisely in order to capture the individuality of this diamond. The enumer-
ation of relevant features obviously presupposes our ability to subsume them
under some general concepts, therefore, it presupposes the work of natural-
scientific concept-formation. This has two fatal consequences for Rickert’s
argument: (1) individualizing concept-formation is independent from value-
relatedness; (2) individualizing concept-formation is not independent from,
but rather presupposes generalizing concept-formation.
Rickert’s answer to this criticism is that Frischeisen-Köhler is right to
highlight elements of generalizing concept-formation at work in the historical
sciences [Rickert 1929, 438–439]. The fact that we use words having a gen-
eral meaning to describe individuals is the most obvious example. However,
in historical research the enumeration of qualities and features that are not
value-related has a merely ancillary function vis-à-vis the overarching goal
of grasping the value-related aspects of the individual(s) under scrutiny. To
return to my earlier example, a meaningful inquiry about recent American
history would likely include some reference to Barack Obama, and privilege
his political views over the color of his suits. However, in order to characterize
Barack Obama’s overall personality a savvy historian might very well turn to
consider in some detail his fashion style, thereby recurring to general concepts
such as “color”, “shape”, and “textile”. None of this would be historically rel-
evant per se, but it would serve the purpose of enabling a better grasp of the
historical individual “Barack Obama”. Moreover, Rickert does acknowledge
the detachability of individualizing concept-formation and value-relatedness.
We can in principle form concepts of individuals that are not related to any
value, such as a random pebble found on the street. This is because “in-
dividualization” is a logical, i.e., purely formal pattern of conceptualization,
whereas “value-relatedness” is a substantive, i.e., material, characterization
of an object-domain. Rickert’s argument, then, is not that value-relatedness
is sufficient for individualizing concept-formation, but rather that individual-
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izing concept-formation is only meaningful for value-related individuals, and
that for such individuals the enumeration of non-value-related features has a
merely ancillary function.
A more to-the-point criticism revolves around the necessity of temporal
individuation for historical objects. Frischeisen-Köhler argues that value-
relatedness alone is not sufficient to conceptualize a historical object. We
need to be able to locate the object at issue in historical time [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1906b, 467]. Frischeisen-Köhler articulates here a position that finds
its most complete expression ten years later in Georg Simmel’s essay Das
Problem der historischen Zeit [Simmel 1980] and is recast by Rickert’s student
Franz Böhm in the short book Ontologie der Geschichte [Böhm 1933, 114].
The point is that history is not just about understanding general kinds of
events or personalities (such as “earthquake”, “famine” or “tyrant”), but rather
about the unique individuation of such general kinds in an unrepeatable time-
venue. This makes for an added layer of meaning, which is genuinely histori-
cal without being derivable from mere elaboration on general historical kinds.
In other words, the mere specification of a definite time-venue transforms,
as it were, an otherwise natural-scientific concept into a historical concept.
In Frischeisen-Köhler’s terms:
For instance, in the formation of the concepts “earthquake” or
“famine” [...] the consideration of generality was dominant.
However, the earthquake of November, 1st 1755, which destroyed
Lisbon, or the famine in Fulda in 750 AD denote specific individ-
ual events. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 168]
Interestingly, the characteristics that set apart these two historical events from
other earthquakes or famines are not explicitly stated by the simple indication
of a historical time-venue. However, the addition of a temporal index to an
otherwise ahistorical configuration of meaning (“earthquake” or “famine”) in-
augurates, as it were, the possibility of an historical investigation spelling out
and conceptualizing these characteristics.
This last point leads to the core of Frischeisen-Köhler’s critique of Rickert’s
view of historical concept-formation. If we ask how historians concretely go
about spelling out these characteristics, it seems that reference to values plays
no role. Frischeisen-Köhler argues that the real method of historical inquiry
consists rather in specification [Präzisierung] and differentiation [Angabe der
Differenzen]. As for specification, the historian will first want to determine
the “variables” left open from the general meaning employed in her inquiry.
For instance, the concept “famine” means a shortage of food affecting the pop-
ulation of a certain geographical area, but it leaves open what kinds of food
were scarce, how many people in what geographical area were affected, and the
like. In order to grasp the famine in Fulda the historian will have to fix these
variables. Second, given a more or less explicitly determined “normal type”
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 469–470] (in the case of a famine, say, average num-
ber of deaths, social groups normally affected, typical political causes, etc.),
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the historian will set out to determine how the event under scrutiny diverges
from the normal type. If a description of the method by which historians
form their concepts has to be more than a generic indication of their over-
arching theoretical aims, then it seems that specification and differentiation
in Frischeisen-Köhler’s sense are better candidates than Rickert’s principle of
value-relatedness.
Finally, Frischeisen-Köhler’s takes issue with Rickert’s positing of supra-
historical values as criteria for the selection of historically relevant objects
from the manifold of experience. Frischeisen-Köhler denies that there are such
values. In keeping with the foregoing point about objects endowed with an
immanent structure and in accordance with Dilthey’s theory of the histori-
cal world, Frischeisen-Köhler argues that the principal concept of history is
not “value” but rather “system” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906b, 474] or, follow-
ing Dilthey’s later terminology, “effective nexus” [Wirkungszusammenhang]
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 176]. Historical events and persons are structured
wholes of individual or communal life. They are, indeed, teleologically orga-
nized nexuses, but their governing principles are not timeless, supra-historical
values. Effective nexuses are organized around goals and clusters of goals
whose origin is in the concrete psychology of the living subjects involved, and
as such they are inherent in such nexuses.
Positing a system of timelessly valid values is thus irrelevant to historical
concept-formation. A correct understanding of the material under scrutiny,
that is, the structural nexuses characterizing historical life, provides the cri-
teria for its conceptualization. We can still call the goals governing the life
of a historical person or community “values” but then these are not epistemic
yardsticks employed by the historian in order to make sense of otherwise dis-
connected historical facts. Values in Frischeisen-Köhler’s (and Dilthey’s) sense
are substantive structures of historical reality that the historian finds as givens
in the material he or she sets out to understand [Frischeisen-Köhler 1906b, 475],
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 186].
5 Frischeisen-Köhler’s phenomenology
Let us now move to the pars construens of Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophical
project. The result of his critical Auseindandersetzung with the neo-Kantians
is that:
Reality is neither a determination of thought, nor a recognized
validity. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 188]
This is, of course, only a negative determination. In order to attain a positive
concept of reality it is imperative to clarify the enigmatic relationship of re-
ality and consciousness. This is because “reality” is often defined in terms of
independence from consciousness. However, given the equivocal nature of the
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term “consciousness” what this definition actually asserts is unclear. A solid
philosophical appraisal of reality must therefore begin with a clarification of
the concept of consciousness.
Frischeisen-Köhler identifies two broad groups of theories about conscious-
ness. One group conceives of consciousness as a “specific function that adds
itself to the given” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 194]. The other group considers
consciousness as the sum total of all experiences, and thus as coincident with
the given. Epitomes of the functional theories of consciousness are Descartes
and Kant, while empiricists such as Hume and Mach are prominent exponents
of the second group. Frischeisen-Köhler finds both groups of theories prob-
lematic. As for the functional theories of consciousness, Frischeisen-Köhler
remarks, a distinction between consciousness qua thinking and the given is
derivative and only arises in reflection. If I suddenly hear a sound, in this
immediate experience there is no trace of a distinction between the sound as
given and my consciousness of the sound as a separate component. The pre-
sentation of the sound and my consciousness of it are one. They can only be
separated abstractly upon reflection. Empiricist theories of consciousness, on
the other hand, fare no better. While they are correct in underscoring that
in concrete pre-reflective experience the given has no superadded “conscious-
ness” grafting onto it, as it were, empiricists unduly overlook the fact that
reflection does reveal a duality of elements in experience, namely, a given
and a consciousness of it. The fact that we normally do not live in the
reflective mode does not invalidate the subject/object distinction invariably
arising from reflection.
For Frischeisen-Köhler a phenomenologically correct view of consciousness
has to strike a middle ground between these two groups of theories:
Every experience [Erlebnis] is accompanied by a kind of aware-
ness [Wissen] that can be expressed in a specific judgment. This
expression in judgment does not occur in the act of experienc-
ing itself; however, it can certainly occur in an act of reflection
directed upon the act of experiencing. In every feeling, in every
sensation, in every action there is something equivalent to an ex-
istential judgment having this feeling, sensation, or action as its
object. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 199]
Should an existential judgment be factually expressed (e.g., “There is this
feeling going on in me”), the corresponding act of judging would be accom-
panied by an implicit awareness of the same kind, which could be made ex-
plicit in a further existential judgment about the underlying act of judging,
and so on ad infinitum. This means that consciousness qua implicit aware-
ness of acts of experiencing “encompasses all contents to the same extent”
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 201]. For this reason, it is impossible to equate con-
sciousness and thinking. Thinking, too, occurs in consciousness as much as
feeling or willing.
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Frischeisen-Köhler considers the unity of consciousness and given in the
act of experiencing as a basic fact that cannot be further accounted for:
This is the mystery of consciousness: consciousness is the condi-
tion of all experiences but it is itself not experienced. [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1912, 202]
Part of this mysterious unity has to do with the intrinsically temporal nature
of consciousness. The main riddle pertaining to time and temporality, at least
since Kant, revolves around their formal character. Is time experienced as
the form of consciousness or as one of its contents, for instance, as particular
temporal index attached to otherwise atemporal sensations? Insight into the
original unity of consciousness and the given in the act of experiencing has the
potential to dissolve this alternative:
[Time] is the form of being-given [Gegebensein] in general.
Therefore it can never be detached from consciousness and its
content. [...] Something present, an awareness that knows about
this presence, and the presence itself are indivisible, and the given
can always be characterized as content of consciousness and fulfill-
ment of time [Zeiterfüllung]. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 214–215]
This conception of consciousness as immediate awareness and as indistin-
guishable from the given underwrites a distinctive interpretation of the “prin-
ciple of consciousness” [der Satz des Bewusstseins], the principle according to
which “all reality is given and determinable only as a content of consciousness”
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 215]. The “consciousness” for which the principle
can be meaningfully asserted “is not identical with the subject coming onto
the scene in the accomplishment of judgment, in all objective cognition, and
in all intentional experiences” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 221]. Accordingly,
“the content of consciousness is not only a phenomenon for a subject [...].
This consciousness is not my consciousness; there is nothing individual to
it; it is present in all being as a component of it, it encompasses the to-
tality of all experiences” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 221]. Crucially, however,
this view should not be taken as a concession to idealism. For Frischeisen-
Köhler the demand of realism bears on the impossibility to remain stuck in
the fragmentary processes of individual consciousness. Realism combats sub-
jective idealism, i.e., the view that there is nothing beyond the experiences
of an individual psychic subject.
The problem of realism is not the “transcendent”, but rather the
“trans-subjective”. Realism does not relate the whole of experi-
ence to something independent from experience. Rather, realism
relates the partial experiences of individual cognitive subjects to
an object of cognition that is common to them all. [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1912, 229]
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None of the entities realism posits are transcendent in the sense of being com-
pletely independent from consciousness in general. Evidence of this fact is that
for centuries philosophical realism sat comfortably with a theological perspec-
tive according to which all beings essentially exist in God, who, in turn, is
conceived of as an all-encompassing consciousness. Realism is concerned with
the existence of a world that transcends the fragmentary experiences of empir-
ical human subjects and not with the existence of a world that is thoroughly
impervious to consciousness in general.
For the post-Kantian epistemologist, however, to say that everything ex-
ists as a content of consciousness does not have a theological coloring, as if
“consciousness in general” named a divine onlooker or a ubiquitous anima
mundi.
Rather, for us consciousness—from which we have to remove the
character of subject, ego, or substance—is only the inescapable
condition, from an epistemological standpoint, in order for some-
thing to be there in general. The whole world with its suns and
stars and peoples and heroes is only a world of appearances, it
exists only to the extent that it is in consciousness; but this con-
sciousness is not mine, it is not yours. I am not the one to whom
the whole world appears; for me and for you the world is full living
reality, which encompasses both of us spatially and temporally in
its totality. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 251–252]
We must, then, very well concede that the world exists in consciousness, how-
ever, “being in consciousness” is nothing but “the most general predicate that
we can assert of reality” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 253], both the inner reality
of acts of experience and the outer reality of the physical world. Therefore, the
problem of reality has to be reformulated. The question is not whether there
is a reality that is entirely transcendent vis-à-vis consciousness in general, or
experience as a whole. The question is rather “whether and in what sense we
are entitled to posit something trans-subjective as the immanent object of cog-
nition beyond the circle of our own personal experiences” [Frischeisen-Köhler
1912, 267]. In other words, the problem of reality ultimately boils down to a
rejection of solipsism, and not to a rejection of the standpoint of consciousness.
Frischeisen-Köhler argues that in light of the absolutely private charac-
ter of our experiences, from a purely theoretical standpoint the reality of the
external world is nothing but a necessary hypothesis, a presupposition that
the fragmentary character of our sensory experience seems to require. For
the philosopher asking theoretical questions about the trans-subjective object
of cognition, reality is nothing more than a “necessary thought” [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1912, 268]. This is because, according to Frischeisen-Köhler, the origin
of our experience of reality is not in thinking but in action. It is in our capacity
as agents, and not as contemplators, that we encounter reality [Frischeisen-
Köhler 1912, 275]. The justification for our belief in the existence of a world
of objects outside our private experiences thus precedes scientific thinking and
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stems from life itself. By way of shifting from the theoretical to the practical
in order to justify our belief in reality, Frischeisen-Köhler reenacts a move that
is somewhat classical in German philosophy at least since Fichte’s popular
writing The Vocation of Man, where the very same shift occurs [Fichte 1981]
for the very same purpose. Frischeisen-Köhler’s mentor Dilthey took a very
similar route in his early writing On the Origin of our Belief in the Existence
of the External World [Dilthey 2010] in which he argues that the experience
of something opposing resistance to our will underlies such belief. In spite of
these historical precedents, Frischeisen-Köhler’s point differs from both Fichte
and Dilthey. Unlike Fichte, who argues that our inborn impulse to act re-
quires a leap of faith in the reality of the world upon which action is directed,
Frischeisen-Köhler argues that in action we have an original experience of real-
ity and not merely a motivation to believe in it. The insistence on an original
experience of reality, rather than a mere belief in it is also a point of differen-
tiation from Dilthey, whom Frischeisen-Köhler nonetheless approvingly quotes
[Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 277, note].4
The most interesting and original aspect of Frischeisen-Köhler’s contribu-
tion to this line of thought is his reliance on phenomenological and descriptive-
psychological sources to support his argument. He takes it as an indisputable
result of recent phenomenology to have identified two distinct components in
experience. Different thinkers have referred to these components with differ-
ent termini, such as content and act (Twardowski), sensation [Empfindung]
and experiences [Erlebnisse] (Husserl) or appearances and psychic functions
(Stumpf). These distinctions have a bearing on the problem of reality. From
the agent’s perspective the domain of appearances is experienced as a field of
resistances and hindrances to the exercise of her own psychic functions. The
impediment of some impulse is not experienced as an immanent development
of the impulse itself, but rather as a something irrupting from the outside in
concomitance with some modification of the sensory materials:
For the volitional ego appearances are not just phenomena, or
better, they are not given only in relation to the ego; rather, they
disclose to the ego something other, something that strives against
[entgegenstrebt] the ego and that the ego experiences as something
through which it feels itself limited, and with which it stands in
reciprocal relation. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 277]
For Frischeisen-Köhler it is important to underscore that the experience of
resistance and counter-striving is not the premise for some kind of logical in-
ference to the existence of reality. We do not posit reality as the unexperienced
4. A parallel treatment of Dilthey’s and Frischeisen-Köhler’s concept of reality is
offered in Josef Frings’s doctoral dissertation [Frings 1927]. This is the only existing
piece of scholarship (partly) devoted to Frischeisen-Köhler’s theoretical philosophy.
Unfortunately, the discussion of Frischeisen-Köhler is limited to a handful of pages
and it is merely expository. Frings also does not address differences between Dilthey
and Frischeisen-Köhler and treats them as endorsing the same position.
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cause of the resistance we experience in action. Rather, “we experience reality
in action [wir erleben wirkend Wirklichkeit]” [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 280].
Crucially, in this original experience the world itself shows up as “voli-
tional”, that is, as a kind of counter-agent whose goals often clash with mine.
For instance, the door “refuses” to open, the cork “doesn’t want” to come out.
Ordinary languages are full of metaphors that point in this direction. These
metaphors are not mere remnants of an archaic past dominated by animistic
thinking. Rather, they bear witness to an original living experience of real-
ity that continues to underlie our transactions in the world even at the most
advanced stages of science and civilization. The original experience of reality
as a volitional whole also short-circuits the problem of attributing a mind to
other bodies. Recognizing other living subjects as volitional centers is nested
in an overarching experience of the world as volitional; other subjects merely
emerge as particularly prominent and self-governed sources of volitions within
an overall volitional nexus.
This characterization of our experience of reality should not be taken as
an irrationalistic celebration of action against thought and science. On the
contrary, Frischeisen-Köhler points out that
science does not create reality or the object of its cognition in the
first place. However, only through science does our awareness of
the real surrounding us receive clarification, determination and
coherence. [...] Our consciousness of reality is rooted in experi-
encing. However, a concept of reality arises for us only through
thinking, i.e., through science. [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 311–312]
Frischeisen-Köhler’s adversary is not science, but only what he considers an
overstatement of the function of science as can be found among the neo-
Kantians.
In the last section of Frischeisen-Köhler’s book, the problem of reality is
formulated as the problem of how such enhancement of our immediate expe-
rience of reality through science is possible. Frischeisen-Köhler tackles this
problem by attempting a deduction (in the Kantian juridical sense) of the
a priori principles for the cognition of nature. The premises underlying this
deduction are: (1) experience is absolutely private (each subject only has ac-
cess to his or her own experience; (2) scientific cognition is not about sensory
appearances, but rather about common objects beyond such appearances; (3)
factually, there is mutual understanding between different subjects. In keeping
with Kant, the contingency and relativity of individual experiences can only
be overcome on the basis of an objective system of relations [Bezugssystem]
and of a universal causal order [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 318]. Starting from
our immediately lived experience of coexistence and succession we can move
to build a mathematically formulated spatio-temporal system, in which all of
our experiences receive definite positions. Frischeisen-Köhler hastens to add
that, unlike Kant, he is not committed to the view that space and time can
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be treated as parallel magnitudes. Time is much more fundamental and, un-
like space, does not admit of construction according to arbitrarily chosen sets
of axioms. True, the advent of relativity in physics deeply transformed our
conception of time. However, Frischeisen-Köhler argues, this transformation
pertains more to how we think about events in time, rather than time it-
self. The basic temporal categories of duration, succession, simultaneity, etc.,
through which physical phenomena are intellectually accessible to us do not
seem to be affected by transformations at the conceptual level as is the case
with spatial categories.
Causality, on the other hand, cannot be derived from experience. However,
for the reasons described in the above critique of neo-Kantianism, it cannot be
reduced to an a priori category of thought either. Frischeisen-Köhler’s opts for
a teleological strategy of justification. Given the goal of mutual understanding
among empirical subjects and given the subjectivity of immediate experience,
spatio-temporality and universal causality must hold, in order for the goal to
be attainable under the given circumstances. This position, however, is not
meant to be just a vague form of pragmatism. The objective validity of these
a priori principles is justified by their continual confirmation in our practical
and experimental transactions in the world [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 344].
The same issue can be raised for the other “half” of the world, namely,
the human or spiritual world [die geistige Welt]. Do we need to establish
some a priori principles, so as to warrant the unity and intelligibility of the
world of psyche and history investigated by the human sciences? In keeping
with his teacher Dilthey, Frischeisen-Köhler answers this question negatively.
Unlike the world of nature, the human world is experienced as unitary, first and
foremost in each individual’s self-consciousness [Frischeisen-Köhler 1912, 361]
and then in the supra-individual phenomena of human culture writ large. This,
of course, does not mean that historians merely have to reproduce historical
reality. History, too, is a form of knowledge that presupposes a conceptual
reconfiguration of the material under scrutiny. However, unlike natural science
history does not need a priori principles in order to justify the applicability
of its concepts to its object-domain, but only empirical hypotheses (largely
of psychological nature) to navigate the complexity of living nexuses whose
intelligibility is, so to speak, already secured from the start.
6 Conclusion
The result of our investigation is that all science relates to a real-
ity, which constitutes the concrete content of science, entails the
material of cognition, and can never be understood merely on the
basis of the formal conditions of knowledge. [Frischeisen-Köhler
1912, 457–458]
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For Frischeisen-Köhler reality factors into cognition not just as a limit con-
cept, but rather as something determined that theoretical thinking sets out to
conceptualize and not to create.
Frischeisen-Köhler’s endeavor to articulate a version of realism in keeping
with the tenets of Kantian transcendental philosophy has various merits. It
avoids both the facile psychologization of the a priori characterizing early neo-
Kantianism and the positivistic identification of the object of cognition with
the object of sensation. However, Frischeisen-Köhler’s clear-cut distinction of
“consciousness in general” as the impersonal encompassing ground of all real-
ity and individual psyche leaves a number of questions unanswered. Isn’t the
notion of a fully impersonal consciousness ultimately a wooden iron? Can we
really make sense of it? The function of Bewusstsein überhaupt in Frischeisen-
Köhler’s argument is clear. It grants the overall accessibility of reality for
theoretical thinking while acknowledging that individual subjects only have
limited access to reality, thus requiring the patient work of science to make
full sense of the world around them. No doubt, from an epistemological point
of view Bewusstsein überhaupt is an extremely useful notion. However, the
fact that it is useful does not make it automatically legitimate, let alone true.
Frischeisen-Köhler’s phenomenology thus seems to ignore the requirement of
intuitive fulfillment at a crucial joint of its articulation. The complexity of
this matter is well documented in Husserl’s life-long struggle with the distinc-
tions between transcendental, personal, and human subjectivity. Cutting the
Gordian knot of subjectivity by removing individual selfhood from the tran-
scendental dimension of consciousness is certainly an effective move, but one
that a self-styled phenomenologist ought to resist.
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